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DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN RELIGIONS: 
SOME THOUGHTS ON READING 
GREENAWALT'S RELIGION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND 
FAIRNESS 
John Finnis* 
Suppose the core teachings of a religion with a significant 
number of followers inside and outside the United States entail 
that significant parts of the United States Constitution, including 
the free exercise and establishment clauses of the First Amend-
ment, ought to be replaced either by peaceful processes such as 
voting or, if need be, by threats and use of force, and that gov-
ernance of the United States, or of such regions, big or small, as 
can be brought under the religion's sway, ought to be entrusted 
to its followers. Would it be constitutional for Congress to forbid 
the entry to the United States of members of that religion un-
willing to make a public declaration renouncing that teaching?1 
Should it be? I raise these questions as a kind of test of the thesis 
prominent in Kent Greenawalt's fine book, that both of the re-
ligion clauses "forbid discrimination among religions" (p. 13) 
(emphasis in original), and that "[ o ]ne of the most powerful 
principles of the religion clauses is that the government may not 
favor some religions at the expense of others" (p. 212). 
You may say: Please, let's just stay in the real world. And 
spare us the embarrassment of trolling through other people's 
* Biolchini Family Professor of Law. University of Notre Dame and Professor of 
Law and Legal Philosophy. University of Oxford. 
1. A low-key version of this might be section 2 of the bill for a Jihad Prevention 
Act. introduced on September 18. 2008. by Rep. Tom Tancredo as H. R. 6975. which pro-
vides. in the relevant part. that "[a]ny alien who fails to attest. in accordance with proce-
dures specified by the Secretary of Homeland Securitv. that the alien will not advocate 
installing a Sharia law system in the United States is in~dmissible." Jihad Prevention Act. 
H.R. 6975. 110th Cong. § 2 (2008). m·ailab/e at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/ 
z?c110:H.R.6975. This is "low-key" because of the stringently narrow meaning ascribed 
to "advocate" in Yates v. United States. 354 U.S. 298.324-25 (1957). overruled on other 
grounds by Burks v. United States. 437 U.S. 1 (1978). 
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faith. especially when this faith's adherents are so typically de-
cent. loyal Americans, and stand with us against secularist de-
gradations of human life and family. Haven't you heard of big-
otry? And I grant that the United States is so big and so unlikely 
to be threatened, as a whole, by any set of persons who would 
have to immigrate by ships and planes that it seems plausible to 
dismiss the hypothesis, or treat it as an occasion for renewed sat-
isfaction that the Constitution compels us to live with the healthy 
risks of freedom, non-establishment, etc. Not every community. 
however, is so fortunately placed. You should regard these re-
flections as an attempt to transpose to the American context. so 
meticulously explored by Greenawalt, a contemporary problem 
that elsewhere is very real, transcends bigotry, and calls on re-
sponsible people to set aside their feelings of embarrassment. 
And it is, in any case, worth testing the intuition enshrined in 
Greenawalt's title, that non-establishment and fairness go hand 
in hand, the former required by the latter. 
To establish the realism of at least part of the hypothesis-
the part which postulates the existence of a religion of the out-
lined kind- and to disestablish the imputations of embarrassing 
bigotry, I will take a short-cut. Since nowadays, I'm told, only 
rank conservatives object to citation of foreign cases in constitu-
tional matters, I call in aid the recent unanimous judgment of 
seventeen judges of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Refah Partisi v. Turkey: 
[T]he Court considers that sharia, which faithfully reflects the 
dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, is stable and 
invariable. Principles such as pluralism in the political sphere 
or the constant evolution of public freedoms have no place in 
it. ... [A] regime based on sharia ... clearly diverges from 
Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law 
and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women 
and the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public 
life in accordance with religious precepts. . . . [A] political 
party whose actions seem to be aimed at introducing 
sharia ... can hardly be regarded as an association complying 
with the democratic ideal that underlies the whole of the 
Convention.' 
On that basis it upheld the Turkish Supreme Court's dissolution 
of Turkey's elected Government and of the country's main 
2. Refah Partisi v. Turkey. 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1. § 123 (2003) (emphasis added) 
(upholding and adopting the language of the Third Section of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Refah Partisi v. Turkey. 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3. § 72 (2002). 
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party, on the grounds that the Government in which that party 
was dominant was preparing-or might well be preparing. and 
there is no obligation to wait until the last moment to be sure of 
such intentions- to introduce shari a either as law applicable to 
all or as part of a scheme in which all citizens would be subjected 
to the law of their respective religion. 
If it is hard for contemporary American constitutionalists to 
take this sort of "militant democracy" -pre-emptive defense of 
democracy-at all seriously. it is even harder to get them to do 
so when it involves steadily focusing on the possibility that a par-
ticular religion- the private faith of fellow citizens or of hard-up 
immigrants-might be different from all other religions in its 
core beliefs about the Constitution, and about the legitimacy of 
long-term deception3 and intimidation in the cause of overthrow-
ing it or, much more immediately. in the cause of rendering cer-
tain constitutional guarantees inapplicable within the religion's 
zone of dominance. And. Greenawalt's new book's commentary 
on these matters is rather oblique. In persuasively defending the 
pre-Smith balancing test for religious claims to exemption from 
generally applicable prohibitions, against Eisgruber and Sager's 
thesis that claims of religious exercise should enjoy constitu-
tional protection if and only if non-exemption (failure to ac-
commodate) would manifest a discriminatory legislative "failure 
of equal regard," Greenawalt takes a critical look at their sug-
gestion (as he paraphrases it) that "[i ]f legislatures or adminis-
trators fairly considered the imposition on members of minority 
religions of a uniform dress code, they would have made excep-
tions." (p. 475).4 He comments that this overlooks a significant 
complexity: "It might be that the reason not to make a particular 
exception-say for girls in school wearing head scarves-is that 
usage reflects and conveys (for some people) a prescribed role 
3. It was part of Turkey's case before the European Court of Human Rights that 
(in the Court's past-tense paraphrase) ··[i]n order to attain its ultimate goal of replacing 
the existing legal order with sharia. political Islam used the method known as rakivve. 
which consisted in hiding its beliefs until it had attained that goat·· Refah Partisi. 35 E.ur. 
H.R. Rep. 3. § 59. The Court did not make any finding about Islamic takiyve (a practice 
which had not been denied by the applicant members of the dissolved government and 
party). but observed more broadly that political parties and movements may conceal 
their aims and profess their adherence to democracv and the rule of law until it is too late 
to prevent them overthrowing both. Refah Parrisi. 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3. §* -IK HO: Refah 
Parrisi. 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. I.* 101. · 
-1. Eisgruber and Sager might protest that this absolutizes their claim. quoted by 
Greenawalt in the preceding sentence. that equal liberty .. will call for exemptions in most 
dress code cases·· (p. 475) (emphasis added). 
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for women that does not correspond to liberal democratic val-
ues." (p. 475) (emphasis in original). 
Greenawalt's point is a fair one. But his dialectic with Eis-
gruber and Sager does not require or even allow him to reach 
the issues I am considering: (1) What if the prohibition were 
aimed precisely at a practice demanded or encouraged by a par-
ticular religion. because it is demanded or encouraged by that re-
ligion as part of a unitary package of tenets of that religion which 
as a package is opposed to the Constitution? Or again: (2) What if 
the prohibition were aimed precisely at a practice demanded or 
encouraged by a particular religion, because it is often imposed 
on members of that religion by (a) unlawful intimidation, or 
(b) unjustified pressure, otherwise impossible to combat effec-
tively? 
Or again, to get a bit closer to the immigration issue: (3) 
What if the prohibition were in the context of state aid, e.g. 
vouchers available for schools including religious schools, pro-
vided that they undertake neither to advocate nor to teach the 
desirability of introducing sharia law into the United States? 
Greenawalt's discussions of the conditions that states may im-
pose on the ideas that schools receiving aid may teach are, 
doubtless necessarily, somewhat inconclusive. "[C]ertain [legisla-
tive] judgments about good and bad values would be constitu-
tionally foreclosed as criteria for a state providing aid," but 
"[ c ]ourts will permit states to set some conditions ... as Ohio re-
quired that schools receiving voucher money in Cleveland [in 
Zelman v Simmons-Harris'] not teach hatred of groups classified 
by race, religion, or ethnic background.'' (p. 459). On the other 
hand, he notes that "Justice Souter amply demonstrates that the 
rule against teaching hatred of groups is fuzzy enough at the 
edges. so that it might be understood to cover teaching of vari-
ous ideas that are embraced by many religious groups" (p. 418).6 
Still, Greenawalt does not seem to draw Souter's definite conclu-
sion that any state aid to religious schools threatens religious lib-
erty and equality amongst religions (or entangles the state in dis-
crimination between religions). The book's treatment, at this 
point, lacks the absolutism foreshadowed by its early (p. 13) ac-
ceptance of the sponsorship of Justice Brennan in Larson v. 
5. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
6. Citing Zelman. 536 U.S. at 713-14: see alsop. 416. where Greenawalt suggests a 
list of other religious (Catholic and Protestant-conspicuously not Islamic) beliefs that 
might be regarded as hatred of others. 
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Valent/ for a near-absolutist rule of non-discrimination amongst 
religions. Against Noah Feldman's argument that a decisive rea-
son for avoiding or outlawing state aid is that the constitutional 
rule of neutrality, applied to such aid, would entail permitting 
the beneficiaries to (both take the money and) teach e.g. "anti-
Americanism, or sexism," Greenawalt objects (pp. 459, 469): 
"Although a state cannot discriminate on the basis of theological 
propositions of a religion, it may be able to require that a 
school's ethical and political teachings be not wholly at odds with 
premises of our liberal democracy." (p. 470).x 
Here a central underlying issue comes into view. What if the 
"theological propositions of a religion" include political teach-
ings "wholly at odds with premises of our liberal democracy" or, 
to speak like the European Court of Human Rights, ''with the 
democratic ideal that underlies the whole of the [Constitution]" 
or, to speak I think more suitably, with the Constitution and 
other principles that we have taken as foundational for our law? 
The matter is, I guess, not settled by cases declaring that 
"The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking ad-
mission for the first time to these shores."~ Such sweeping decla-
rations are qualified even by those who, like the majority in 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 111 recite them in the context 
of a rights-articulating provision such as the Fourth Amendment. 
The declarations, like the result in Verugo-Urquidez, were re-
jected by the same Justice Brennan who authored Larson v. 
Valente. It is easy to envisage judges of Brennan's 
(Greenawalt's?) persuasion jumping off from the absoluteness of 
the prohibition: "shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion." No need (the argument might run) to predicate a 
correlative right in aliens abroad; many citizen members of the 
"dis-established" religion might be deemed to have standing to 
challenge its discriminatory, "other-religions-establishing" re-
striction on their opportunity to be joined by co-religionists 
7. Larson v. Valente. 456 U.S. 228 (19R2). 
8. Greenawalt adds. to me somewhat obscurelv: ··If the only concern is about dis-
crimination. the inquiry should be whether state restiictions on fo~ms of teaching consti-
tute some kind of discrimination. Presumably more would need to be shown than that 
some religious groups actually do want to e~gage in the kind of teaching that is disal-
lowed." (p. 470). Then he adds. to me more intelligibly: "[H]owever. the concern here 
goes beyond discrimination to whether the government impedes religious liberty by set-
ting up standards for instruction about morals and politics with which religious groups 
wanting state assistance for their schools must comply ... (p. 470). 
9. Bridges v. Wixson. 326 U.S. 135. 161 (1945) (Murphy. 1 .. concurring). Also 
quoted in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. 494 U.S. 259. 271 (1990). 
10. Verdugo- Urquidez. 494 U.S. 259. 
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(family-members. imams, etc.) from abroad. Other absolutist 
pronouncements of the Court would be called in aid, such as Jus-
tice Kennedy's statement in the Lukumi case that: 
[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible, 
if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices 
because of their religious motivation. the law is not neutral, 
and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest 
and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. 11 
Would ending immigration by Muslims, or by Muslims who will 
not publicly renounce sharia for America, be "targeting their be-
liefs as such"? Would it be "to infringe upon or restrict their 
practices because of their religious motivation"? The categories 
creak. But one can readily foresee the first part of Justice Ken-
nedy's loosely constructed sentence being pressed into service. 
To be sure. Greenawalt nowhere opts for absoluteness, but 
instead for a non-discrimination demand that is defeasible in 
principle. It's a matter of strict scrutiny, scrutiny seeking a com-
pelling state interest. Strict scrutiny in religious liberty cases has 
proved "feeble." But in religious discrimination cases it has hith-
erto been strict enough to be uniformly fatal, 12 absent historic 
practices such as legislative prayers (anomalies bitterly repudi-
ated by the Brennan absolutists). 
To conclude this provocation: Because numbers-critical 
masses-matter. times change. A legislature looking forward 
from now, or fairly soon, might responsibly decide that the only 
likely medium-term constructive alternative to forbidding immi-
gration by persons unwilling to renounce their religion's core 
theologico-political and numbers-dependent drive to impose po-
litical and legal domination will foreseeably prove to be the state-
promoted introduction-as is beginning to be ventured in 
France, Germany and the U.K.-of an emasculated version of 
Islam. supervised by state instrumentalities responsible for se-
lecting the teachers and preachers of that highly distinctive relig-
ion in the hope of watering down its inbuilt focus on domination, 
violence and submission, its division of the world into the world 
of Islam and the world of war, its public and private subjection 
of women. and other features that (so the legislature might 
judge) make it at best inassimilable and at worst a clear and 
11. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. Inc. v. City of Hialeah. 508 U.S. 520. 533 
(1993) (citations omitted). 
12. Adam Winkler. Fatal in Theon• and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of 
Stricr Scrutinv in the Federal Courts. 59 VAND. L. REV. 793.860--62 (2006). 
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mounting danger. If the latter alternative (State-sponsored Is-
lam) is to be judged permanently unavailable here, because a 
plain "establishment of religion," still the resort to it by centrist 
European governments might go some way towards (a) showing 
a compelling state interest in not leaving this religion and its fol-
lowers to their own devices, and thus (b) surmounting the bar 
raised by the beguiling but curious doctrine that discrimination 
against one religion is (as Greenawalt seems implicitly to con-
tend) not only unfair but also an establishment of all the others 
(and of irreligion?). 
